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1.  Introduction 
Experimental economists are concerned about possible distortions of data caused by sugges-
tive wording. Therefore, it has become a tradition to formulate instructions for economic ex-
periments as neutrally as possible, avoiding all connotations caused by the choice of words 
that might affect decision behaviour.
1 Even when researchers are modelling real-life situa-
tions, they often present the task to the subjects in completely abstract terminology. Examples 
of experimental studies that interpret their results as real-life situations differing from the con-
text of the instructions cover a broad area of research interests. FEHR, GÄCHTER  and 
KIRCHSTEIGER (1997) study experimental labour markets, but present the task to their subjects 
as an interaction between sellers and buyers. FEHR and ZYCH (1998) study intertemporal buy-
ing behaviour and draw conclusions on addiction.  GÜTH, IVANOVA-STENZEL  and TJOTTA 
(1999) conduct a 2-period ultimatum game framed as a joint venture, and interpret it as en-
gagement in a marriage. KESER, RULLIÈRE and VILLEVAL (1999) conduct a neutrally framed 
public good game where contributions are interpreted as joining a union. POTTERS and VAN 
WINDEN (2000) draw conclusions from a context-free signalling game with regard to behav-
iour of lobbyists and policymakers. IRLENBUSCH and SUTTER  (2001) conduct a neutrally 
framed public bad experiment supplemented with a voting procedure and interpret it as fiscal 
policy making of EMU-member countries in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.  
Arguably, using neutrally worded instructions has become the mainstream practice in experi-
mental economics. However, this approach is not at all undisputed in the community. Several 
scholars argue that the use of neutral instructions may distort the interpretability of experi-
mental results with respect to the real-life situations researchers are interested in. ECKEL and 
GROSSMANN (1996) emphasise that the importance of social and psychological factors can 
only be studied by (at least to some extent) abandoning abstraction.
2 As LOOMES (1999, F39) 
comments: “It may be rather more useful to try to study the impact of context than to pursue 
the impossible goal of eliminating it.” 
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the research agenda suggested by LOOMES in 
the above quotation. Though many scholars hold strong views on the “right” way of present-
ing experimental tasks, systematic comparisons of context-free and in-context presentations 
of the same task are surprisingly rare. However, the existing evidence shows that even the 
slightest changes in the instructions' wording can change the experimental outcomes tremen-
dously. In the experiments reported by ROSS and WARD (1996) and LIBERMAN, SAMUELS and 
ROSS (2002) a simple prisoners' dilemma game is labelled differently in two different treat-
ments. In one of them it is called the "Community Game", in the other one the "Wall Street 
Game". Otherwise, the game and the instructions are identical. As a consequence of this small 
change, the rates of co-operation dropped significantly in the "Wall Street" labelling. This re-
                                                           
1 See DAVIS and HOLT (1993), HOLT (1995), KACHELMEIER and SHEHATA (1997). 
2 Similar arguments are put forward by, e.g., GIGERENZER (1996), ORTMANN and GIGERENZER (1997), LOEWEN-
STEIN (1999), and GÄCHTER and RIEDL (2002). 
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sult, originally found with American college students, was replicated with Israeli pilot train-
ees. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect was dramatically underestimated in predictions 
made by people who knew the players well. 
A comparably strong effect has been found by BURNHAM, MCCABE, and SMITH (2000), who 
conduct an experiment on a two-player reciprocity game. In their sequential game, both play-
ers can improve their payoff over the subgame-perfect equilibrium by a sequence of co-
operative moves. To do so, however, it is essential that the first mover trusts the second 
mover, and the second mover reciprocates. The game is played repeatedly in two treatments 
with distinct pairs on each trial. Treatments are identical except for one single expression: In 
the first treatment, the other player is called “partner”, in the second treatment “opponent”. 
This priming by exchanging one word only is already sufficient to induce a significant differ-
ence in trust and trustworthiness behaviour: trustworthiness is observed over twice as much 
when the counterpart is called “partner”.
3 This reinforces trust, although both trust and trust-
worthiness erode over time. 
These results look alarming for experimental economists. If behaviour in the laboratory is so 
sensitive to small changes in the presentation of the task, can we comfortably project findings 
from experiments into the real-life situation we are interested in? This question seems espe-
cially crucial when the real-world context we study is heavily loaded with positive or negative 
preconceptions. This is the case in many experimental areas, but becomes especially obvious 
for the experimental modelling of crime, as e.g. in tax evasion and corruption experiments.  
In this paper, we raise the question whether and to what extent the presentation of context af-
fects behaviour in a corruption scenario. As a criminal and socially harmful activity, corrup-
tion is strongly loaded with negative attitudes towards it. Thus, in light of the dramatic effects 
observed in previous experiments an experimental corruption scenario should be particularly 
susceptible to effects induced by experimental instructions. The experimental paradigm we 
use is the bribery game by ABBINK, IRLENBUSCH, and RENNER (2002, AIR hereafter), who 
model a bribery relationship between briber and bribee as a trust game
4 in which reciprocal 
behaviour is socially undesirable and subject to punishment when discovered.
5 We report two 
treatments of the experiment. In our new treatment, we present the task as an interaction be-
tween a firm and a public official, where the firm can make private payments to get a permis-
                                                           
3 See also HOFFMAN, MCCABE and SMITH (2000). For a further study on priming effects see ORTMANN, FITZ-
GERALD, and BOEING (2000). 
4 In trust (or reciprocity) games a first mover can send money to a second mover, who in turn can voluntarily re-
ward the trustor by sending money back. The games are constructed such that by doing so, both players are bet-
ter off with respect to final payoffs, but in equilibrium no trust and no rewarding would be exhibited. However, 
subjects frequently co-operate (FEHR, KIRCHSTEIGER, and RIEDL 1993, BERG, DICKHAUT, and MCCABE 1995, 
DUFWENBERG and GNEEZY 2000, FAHR and IRLENBUSCH 2000).  
5 A considerable theoretical literature on corruption has preceded these experimental studies. References include 
ROSE-ACKERMAN (1985), KLITGAARD (1988), and SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1993). The only experimental studies 
on corruption known to us are, besides AIR and its successors (ABBINK 2000, 2002), the individual decision ex-
periment by FRANK and SCHULZE (2000). The latter authors use only loaded instructions. 
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sion for running a plant. The firm's activity causes negative consequences to the public. In the 
other treatment, taken from AIR's data, the game is presented in a completely neutral fashion. 
Our data exhibit only mild effects of the treatment, and we do not find significant differences. 
This is surprising as our manipulation appears far stronger than the ones reported in the litera-
ture mentioned earlier. We conjecture that the experimental design transmits the essential fea-
tures of a bribery situation already with the neutral framing, such that the presentation does 
not add substantially to subjects’ interpretation of the task. 
2.   Experimental Evidence on Framing Effects 
In this section we give a brief overview on the economic and psychological literature on fram-
ing effects. A framing effect is said to be present if the presentation of the task leads decision 
makers to change behaviour, even though the underlying information and decision options 
remain essentially the same. In this case, we may say that two statements of a problem are 
logically equivalent, but not transparently equivalent (COOKSON 2000, RABIN 1998).  
We report on a rather broad domain of research areas related to the goal of our study. The ma-
jor categories of framing effects we are interested in are valence and pure framing effects. A 
valence effect is known as the fact that the same essential information is given in either a 
positive or negative light (LEVIN, SCHNEIDER and GAETH 1998). A pure framing effect is said 
to be present if subjects are confronted with alternative, but objectively equivalent problem 
wordings (ELLIOTT and HAYWARD, 1998). The dividing line between these two categories is 
not always sharp; one can say that in general, a pure framing effect does not involve different 
value judgements of the frames. Putting subjects into the context of a bribery environment 
may elicit associations attributable to the impact of both kinds of framing effects. 
The first instances of valence effects are reported in the seminal studies by KAHNEMAN and 
TVERSKY (1979) and TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN (1981).
6 This research is concerned with the 
reflection effect of prospect theory (KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY (1979)). Individuals are willing 
to take risks when it gives them a chance to avoid losses, but they tend to be risk-averse when 
they are confronted with opportunities to make gains. The famous study by TVERSKY and 
KAHNEMAN (1981) on the Asian disease problem shows a choice reversal effect. The authors 
elicit subjects' attitudes towards a program against a fictitious disease, and present the tasks 
either in positive terms (number of lives saved) or in negative terms (number of lives lost). 
Subjects had to choose one of two options: a risky outcome with identical expected value  and 
a sure outcome. TVERSKY and KAHNEMAN find that the majority of subjects who are given the 
positively framed task chooses the sure outcome whereas the majority of subjects who are 
given the negatively framed task goes for the risky choice. 
                                                           
6 For recent studies replicating the results of the original KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY studies see KÜHBERGER, 
SCHULTE-MECKLENBECK, and PERNER (1999), DRUCKMAN (2001). 
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In the economic literature, valence effects are frequently studied in a public good setting. A 
gain frame in which the incentive structure is framed as a positive externality is contrasted 
with a loss frame that states a negative externality (c.f. ANDREONI 1995, SONNEMANS, 
SCHRAM and OFFERMAN 1998, WILLINGER and ZIEGELMEIER 1999, COOKSON 2000, PARK 
2000
7). All authors find strong and systematic framing effects. Co-operation in the positively 
framed situation is significantly higher than with a negative frame. However, effects of fram-
ing are not confined to social dilemma situations. WEBER, KEPPE and MEYER-DELIUS (2000) 
find that also in an experimental market environment negative and positive framing of en-
dowments affects outcomes. Subjects were confronted with either a potential loss or a poten-
tial gain. They were willing to pay substantially higher prices to buy assets to cover a poten-
tial loss. In addition, trading volume was affected by framing. TRAUB (1999) investigates the 
impact of the valence effect by framing a tax privilege for being married (having one or two 
child/ren) either as a tax rebate for married couples (with child/ren) or as a tax surcharge for 
singles (childless couples). He finds evidence that the tax rebates (gain frame) on average ex-
ceed the corresponding surcharges (loss frame).  
A rich body of psychological valence research shows that cognitive, individual and situational 
factors reinforce or mitigate framing effects. An extensive survey on psychological valence 
research and a typology of valence effects is given in LEVIN, SCHNEIDER and GAETH (1998)
8 
showing that studies of these effects include domains as diverse as cognition, psycholinguis-
tics, perception, social, health, clinical and educational psychology as well as marketing and 
other business fields.  
Early investigations of pure framing effects are the experiments by PRUITT (1967) as well as 
SELTEN and BERG (1970). PRUITT (1967) compares the usual presentation of the prisoner’s di-
lemma in bimatrix form with the decomposed form, and shows that the latter leads to substan-
tially higher co-operation. SELTEN and BERG (1970) in a study of face-to-face duopoly ex-
periments, systematically vary the presentation of the payoff-relevant variable ‘financial as-
sets’, composed of initial assets and total profits. This variation, though game theoretically ir-
relevant, essentially influences the mode of co-operation.
9  
The impact of instruction framing on behaviour, as addressed in the present study, has rarely 
been systematically tested. COOPER, KAGEL, LO, and GU (1999) report an experiment on the 
ratchet effect game
10 with managers and students in the People’s Republic of China using in-
                                                           
7 PARK (2000) replicated the original ANDREONI (1995) experiment with more independent observations and 
confirmed Andreoni’s findings on the framing effects. 
8 See LEVIN, GAETH and SCHREIBER (2002) for a recent study on valence effects using a within-subject design. 
9 Related studies are ALBERS and HARSTAD (1991), SCHOTTER, WEIGELT and WILSON (1994), NEALE and BAZ-
ERMAN (1995), JOHANNESSON and JOHANSSON (1997), ELLIOTT, HAYWARD, and CANON (1998), BLOUNT and 
LARRICK (2000), and FEHR and TYRAN (2001).  
10 The ratchet effect is especially important in centrally planned economies if high-productivity firms signal a 
low productivity by reducing their performance on which the central planner bases his targets on input usage and 
output levels. If firms behave in such a manner the ratchet effect can seriously reduce production and is therefore 
said to be especially important in centrally planned economies. 
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context versus generic instructions. They find that loaded instructions had a much larger and 
more consistent effect on managers than on students. Using a context facilitated the develop-
ment of strategic play among managers but had much lower effect on students.  
The wording of experimental instructions can also draw subjects’ attention to social or ethical 
aspects of the environment. The social aspect of framing is addressed in the study by BURN-
HAM, MCCABE, and SMITH (2000) mentioned earlier. The ethical aspect is tackled in two ex-
periments on tax evasion. BALDRY (1986) conducts one treatment in which a tax evasion 
situation is presented to subjects as such, and compares the results to a treatment in which the 
corresponding decision task is presented as a gambling opportunity. He finds that subjects 
tend to “evade taxes” much more in the gambling treatment. On the other hand, ALM, 
MCCLELLAND, and SCHULZE (1992) compare loaded and neutral instructions in an otherwise 
identical tax evasion task, and do not find any significant differences.  
3.  The Experimental Design 
Consider the following situation: a firm wishes to run an industrial plant which causes nega-
tive consequences to the public (e.g. running the facility might pollute the environment). A 
public official must decide every period whether to give the permission to the firm. The firm, 
however, can make a private payment to the official in the hope to influence the official’s de-
cision. This situation was explained to the subjects in our experiment. 
The game we use in our experiment has been introduced by AIR. A firm, as a potential briber, 
first decides whether to make a private payoff to a public official. If he decides to do so, he 
must specify the amount to be sent, which can be an integer of the range from 0 to 9 talers 
(the taler is the fictitious experimental currency). If he transfers a positive amount, the public 
official decides whether to accept or reject the bribe. If she rejects, no money is transferred, 
but the firm must pay a relatively small transfer fee of 2 talers (which represents initiation 
costs). If the public official accepts the bribe, then the amount offered is deducted from the 
firm’s account. The amount is then multiplied by the factor three before being credited to the 
official’s account. The multiplier reflects a difference in marginal utility: the same amount of 
money can be expected to mean much less to a relatively rich and large firm than to a public 
official with a smaller income.
11  
When a bribe has been accepted, a lottery is played out. With a probability of 0.3%, the sud-
den death event occurs: Both players are disqualified from the experiment. Their cumulative 
earnings are cleared from their accounts, and they are not allowed to play further rounds. The 
sudden death, which is probably the most severe penalty to be imposed in the experimental 
framework, represents the consequences arising from discovery of corrupt activities, namely 
drastic fines and job loss. 
                                                           
11 Further, the factor ensures that negative total earnings cannot result from the firm transferring too much. 
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At the last stage of the game, the public official must decide whether or not to permit running 
the plant. Since giving the permission requires effort to justify her choice before her superiors, 
it is slightly less preferable to her, apart from potential bribes. However, it is much more fa-
vourable to the briber. In numbers, both players receive a payoff of 36 talers when the permis-
sion is refused, whereas in case of permission the payoffs are 56 talers for the firm, and 30 for 
the public official (not including private payments). In addition, the permission damages the 
public: each of the other participants in the session suffers a deduction of 3 talers. The conse-
quences of a permission to a single individual are relatively small, but they add up to substan-
tial amounts since they are spread over many people. In total, permissions are inefficient: the 
mutual gains obtained by the two players in a pair never exceed the efficiency loss of 48 talers 
caused by the damage done to the 16 other participants. 
As corruption is done secretly, no feedback is provided about decisions made by participants 
playing in other pairs. Thus, no-one possesses any information about the corruption level in 
the session, and consequently no subject is informed about the extent to which (s)he is dam-
aged by others. Both treatments were played in 30-round supergames between the same play-
ers. Thus, a long-term relationship between a briber and a public official was modelled.  
Figure 1 depicts the game tree of the stage game. Player “F” is the firm, player “P” the public 
official. “C” denotes a chance move. The “hangman” symbol illustrates the event of sudden 
death. The lines “–3...–3” mean that all 16 other subjects are damaged by 3 talers. 
The equilibrium outcome of the stage game is straightforward to obtain. On an equilibrium 
path, the public official will always refuse the permission at her terminal decision nodes. 
Given that, the payoff the firm can get by making a private payment (34, 34 – t, or the sudden 
death) is always strictly worse than the 36 talers he will receive when he transfers nothing. 
Thus, in an equilibrium, the firm does not pay bribes, and the official does not grant a permis-
sion
12.  
The experiment was conducted at the Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung 
at the University of Bonn. The data of the treatment with neutral instructions has been taken 
from the original AIR study, which was conducted under exactly the same circumstances in 
the same laboratory. All subjects were recruited with posters on the campus advertising the 
experiment. Most of them were students from various disciplines, where law and economics 
students constituted the largest fractions. Subjects could participate in only one treatment of 
any bribery experiment.  
The design of the experimental software (implemented using RatImage, ABBINK and SADRIEH 
1995) was analogous in both treatments, except that in the loaded instructions condition the 
neutral wording has been replaced by the corresponding terms of the bribery story. All possi-
ble moves were visible on the same screen. After all decisions of a round had been made, the 
subjects were informed about their payoffs resulting from their own pair’s decisions, and they 
                                                           
12 A detailed proof is available upon request (cf. also ABBINK 2002). 
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were reminded that their payoffs would also be influenced by the decisions of all other pairs 
in the experiment.  
Each session began with an introductory talk. A translation of the hand-outs is reproduced in 
the appendix. Payoff tables, also reproduced in the appendix, were handed out to increase the 
transparency of the game. The main differences in wording between the loaded and the neu-
tral instructions are shown in table 1. In addition to the replacement of expressions, a para-





























The instructions were read aloud and explained in detail. After the introduction, the subjects 
were seated in cubicles, visually separated from one another by curtains. The terminal num-
bers, which determined the role of a subject as being firm or public official, were assigned to 
the subjects by random draw. After the subjects had been seated, the play started immediately. 
The role of a participant remained unchanged throughout the experiment. In the first round, 
pairs of participants, i.e. one firm and one public official, were matched randomly and re-
mained unchanged throughout the experiment. The thirty rounds of the experiment were 
played in slightly less than an hour, such that a whole session took about 1
1/2 hours including 
instructions. At the end of the experiment, subjects were also requested to estimate overall 
probabilities of disqualification for nine given parameter constellations
13. 
 
                                                           
13 The data from the questionnaires replicate AIR’s findings of a tendency to under-estimate the probability of 
disqualification.  
  7 
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To ensure that disqualified subjects would not leave the session, we gave them on-screen 
questionnaires, which they had to fill in while the other subjects completed the session. These 
questionnaires were meant to keep disqualified subjects busy rather than to collect meaningful 
data. A lump sum show-up fee of DM 5 incentivised disqualified players to remain seated. 
Immediately after the session, the subjects were paid anonymously in cash, at an exchange 
rate of 0.03 DM per taler. The total earnings ranged from DM 5.00 (in the neutral instructions 
treatment, one pair of subjects was unlucky in the sudden death lotteries) to DM 46.67 with an 
average of DM 33.38 for 1
1/2 hours, which is considerably more than a student’s regular per 
hour wage in Bonn. 1 DM is equivalent to € 0.51. At the time of the experiment the exchange 
rate to the US-$ was approximately 0.49 $/DM. 
Two sessions with 18 subjects were conducted with the loaded treatment. Since each session 
comprises nine statistically independent observations, we obtain 18 independent observations 
in each treatment. The same number of observations is available for the neutral treatment. 
4.  Results 
We measure the level of corruption mainly by two variables. The average offered transfer 
measures the firms’ propensity to pay bribes, the frequency of permissions measures the ex-
tent to which decisions have been manipulated by bribery. Table 2 shows the average offered 
transfers per round made by the single firms. Table 3 shows the average frequency of permis-
sions given by the single public officials. All numbers are ordered from the lowest to the 
highest value in a treatment. 
We do not find strong support for an instruction framing effect in the data. Figure 2 shows the 
average amount that is offered per round, over the 30 rounds of the experiment, in the aggre-
gate of all sessions. On average over the whole experiment, 2.56 talers are transferred per 
round, compared to 2.93 talers in the neutral instructions treatment. Figure 3 shows the distri-
bution of bribe offers. In both treatments, the distribution of offers is rather similar, with 
peaks at transfers of 0 and 6 talers.
14 The slightly smaller average bribe offer in the loaded in-
structions treatment is not significant. The Mann-Whitney-U test, applied to the average bribe 
                                                           
14 If the briber transfers 6 talers, and the official accepts and gives the permission, then both players’ payoffs are 
equal (48 talers). Payoff equalisation appears to be the predominant fairness norm between briber and bribee. 
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offer in the 18 pairs of each treatment, does not reject the null hypothesis of equal bribe offers 
in both treatments (p = 0.39 one-sided). 
Figure 4 shows the average percentage of permissions given. Though the average frequency 
appears to be somewhat smaller with loaded instructions (32.4% compared to 43.3% with 
neutral instructions), the result is far from being significant. The Mann-Whitney-U test, ap-
plied to the average percentage of permissions in the 18 pairs of each treatment, does not re-
ject the null hypothesis of equal permissions in both treatments (p = 0.27 one-sided). Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the lower tendency to give permissions (choose the Y al-
ternative) is due to (random) sampling variation.  
Table 2. Average Bribe Offer by Individ-
ual Firms 
 
Table 3. Frequency of Permissions by In-
dividual Public Officials 
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Table 4 shows rejection behaviour. Though the percentage of rejected positive offers is higher 
with loaded instructions (21.3% compared to 12.0 % with neutral instructions), the difference 
in rejection frequencies is not significant (p = 0.342 one-sided, according to the Mann-
Whitney U-test applied to the absolute number of rejections by the individual public officials) 
and possibly due to the insignificantly higher number of low bribe offers (< 6 taler), which are 
more likely to be rejected.  
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Table 4.  Rejections of bribe offers (aggregate data) 
  loaded instructions  neutral instructions 














































  54 254 33 274 
Avg. 21.3%  12.0% 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our results do not provide strong evidence for instruction framing in the present bribery ex-
periment. If there is a tendency towards lower levels of corruption (which might be suggested 
by the lower average bribe offers, the higher percentage of rejected positive offers and the 
lower frequency of permissions given by the public officials), it appears to be weak, at least 
not strong enough to show up as statistically significant in our data set. Although our design 
involves much stronger manipulation of the instructions than previous studies, and involves 
an activity heavily loaded with negative ethical connotations, we are not able to find support 
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for instruction framing. This suggests that instruction framing, though it has been found in 
some contexts, is not necessarily a robust phenomenon. Rather, it seems to be very specific to 
the strategic environment under study. 
The data suggest that the present environment is not very sensitive to framing effects through 
differently worded instructions. Why could we obtain no framing effect? Several answers 
seem plausible. First, the game was developed with the sole purpose to capture the most im-
portant features of a bribery scenario. Thus, even with neutral framing the game may appear 
less abstract than the more generic games studied earlier. Second, the game is very simple. 
The loaded framing does not seem to change its accessibility. If subjects are guided by the 
structure of the game only, then the loaded framing should not influence their approach to the 
task. Third, all payoffs are presented in the same way. Therefore, effects arising from differ-
ent presentations of numbers (as in gains versus losses frames) cannot be effective. Fourth, 
the treatments are not characterised by a different degree of complexity. Subjects do not have 
to invest cognitive effort to translate one situation into another. Therefore, subjects might 
“transcend the frame” (CHATTERJEE, HEATH, MILBERG, and FRANCE 2000). Finally, the thirty 
rounds of the experiment give subjects time and opportunity to familiarise themselves with 
the situation, and we offered substantial monetary rewards to give the subjects sufficient in-
centives to do so. 
What do our results contribute to the debate on the "right" way to present an experimental 
task? On the one hand, they suggest that neutrally framed experiments are not necessarily less 
interpretable in terms of a real-life situation than those presented in a context. On the other 
hand, they indicate that using context does not necessarily distort experimental results or dis-
tract subjects from the strategic situation. Of course, our experiment can be just one step to-
wards a comprehensive exploration of the matter. Identifying characteristics that make an ex-
periment prone to such effects will be an important research agenda for the future.  
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Appendix. The Written Instructions (original text in German) 
Loaded Treatment 
In this experiment you are in an interactive decision situation between a firm and a public official. The firm 
wishes to run a plant which causes negative consequences to the public. In each round, the public official must 
decide whether or not to grant the permission. In advance, the firm can offer a private payment to the public offi-
cial, who can accept or reject the offer. 
All in all 18 persons participate in the decision making experiment. There are two types of participants: Firms 
and public officials. At the beginning of the experiment, the type of each participant is randomly drawn. The 
type of a participant remains unchanged throughout the experiment.  
In the first round, pairs of participants are matched randomly. One firm and one public official are matched to 
one another. Thus, both participants do not know with whom they play. The pairs remain unchanged throughout 
the experiment.  
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment you will receive a payoff that depends on 
your success. 
Decision Situation in a Round 
Stage 1: Offer of a private payment 
First, the firm decides whether or not he wants to offer a private payment to the public official. If he does, then 
the credit of the firm is reduced by offer costs of 2 talers, and the play is continued with stage 2. If the firm does 
not want to offer a private payment, then both credits remain unchanged, and the play is continued with stage 4. 
Stage 2: The amount to be offered 
The firm decides on the amount to be offered to the public official as a private payment. The firm can choose be-
tween 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 talers. The play is continued with stage 3.  
Stage 3: Acceptance or Rejection of the private payment 
The public official decides on whether he accepts or rejects the proposed private payment. 
  If the public official accepts the private payment, then the credit of the firm is reduced by the amount he 
proposed. The public official’s credit is increased by the tripled amount that is paid. If a private payment is 
made and accepted, then this can be discovered with a certain probability. Therefore, a number out of the range 
from 0 to 999 is randomly drawn. 
If the randomly drawn number is 0, 1, or 2, then the private payment is discovered. The firm and the public offi-
cial are punished with disqualification. That means: The play ends for these two participants, and they do 
not receive any payment for the play, i.e. also the talers that have been earned in the past are cleared from 
their accounts. (In the end of the experiment, both participants receive only the show up fee, see below). The 
two disqualified participants fill in a questionnaire, until the experiment has ended. For the other participants, the 
play is continued normally. 
If the randomly drawn number is 3, 4, ..., 998, or 999, then the private payment is not discovered, and the play is 
continued with stage 4. 
  If the public official rejects the transfer, then the credits remain unchanged (The offer costs from stage 1, 
however, are also paid in case of rejection). The play is continued with stage 4. 
Stage 4: Decision on Granting the Permission  
The public official chooses whether or not to grant the permission to the firm.  
  If the public official does not grant the permission, then his credit and the credit of the firm matched with 
him are increased by 36 talers each. The credits of the 16 other participants are not changed by this decision. 
  If the public official grants the permission, then the firm’s credit is increased by 56 talers, whereas the pub-
lic official’s credit is increased by 30 talers. The credit of each of the 16 other participants is decreased by 3 
talers by this decision.  
Attention:  by each of the eight other pairs, in which a permission is granted, the payoff for the firm as well as 
for the public official is decreased by 3 talers, i.e. at maximum eight times 3 and at minimum no talers are de-
ducted from the firm’s and the public official’s credits each. The deductions by decisions of other pairs are not 
announced before the experiment has ended.  
After stage 4, the round has ended. The round payoffs are the sum of all credit changes during the four stages.  
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The payoffs 
You receive your payoff at the end of the experiment, where the exchange rate is DM 3.00 for 100 talers. In ad-
dition, you receive a lump sum show up fee of DM 5.00. 
Neutral Treatment 
All in all 18 persons participate in the decision making experiment. There are two types of participants: Player 1 
and Player 2. At the beginning of the experiment, the type of each participant is randomly drawn. The type of a 
participant remains unchanged throughout the experiment.  
In the first round, pairs of participants are matched randomly. One firm and one public official are matched to 
one another. Thus, both participants do not know with whom they play. The pairs remain unchanged throughout 
the experiment.  
The experiment consists of 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment you will receive a payoff that depends on 
your success. 
Decision Situation in a Round 
Stage 1: Transfer or no Transfer 
First, player 1 decides whether or not he wants to transfer an amount to player 2. If he does, then the credit of 
player 1 is reduced by 2 talers, and the play is continued with stage 2. If player 1 does not want to transfer an 
amount, then both credits remain unchanged, and the play is continued with stage 4. 
Stage 2: The Amount to Be Transferred 
Player 1 decides on the amount to be transferred to player 2. Player 1 can choose between 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 
9 talers. The play is continued with stage 3.  
Stage 3: Acceptance or Rejection of the Transfer 
Player 2 decides on whether he accepts or rejects the proposed transfer. 
  If player 2 accepts the transfer, then the credit of player 1 is reduced by the amount he proposed. Player 2’s 
credit is increased by the tripled amount that is transferred. In the following, a number out of the range from 0 
to 999 is randomly drawn. 
If the randomly drawn number is 0, 1, or 2, then player 2 and the player 1 matched with him are disqualified. 
That means: The play ends for these two players, and they do not receive any payment for the play, i.e. also 
the talers that have been earned in the past are cleared from their accounts. (In the end of the experiment, 
both players receive only the show up fee, see below). The two disqualified participants fill in a questionnaire, 
until the experiment has ended. For the other participants, the play is continued normally. 
If the randomly drawn number is 3, 4, ..., 998, or 999, then the play is continued with stage 4. 
  If player 2 rejects the transfer, then the credits remain unchanged (The transfer fee from stage 1, however, is 
also paid in case of rejection). The play is continued with stage 4. 
Stage 4: Choice Between X and Y 
Player 2 chooses one of the alternatives X or Y.  
  If player 2 selects alternative X, then his credit and the credit of the player 1 matched with him are increased 
by 36 talers each. The credits of the 16 other participants is not changed by this decision. 
  If player 2 selects alternative Y, then player 1’s credit is increased by 56 talers, whereas player 2’s credit is 
increased by 30 talers. The credit of each of the 16 other particpants is decreased by 3 talers by this decision.  
Attention:  by each of the eight other pairs, in which Y is chosen, the payoff for player 1 as well as for player 2 is 
decreased by 3 talers, i.e. at maximum eight times 3 and at minimum no talers are deducted from player 1’s and 
player 2’s credits each. The deductions by decisions of other pairs are not announced before the experiment has 
ended.  
After stage 4, the round has ended. The round payoffs are the sum of all credit changes during the four stages.  
The payoffs 
You receive your payoff at the end of the experiment, where the exchange rate is DM 3.00 for 100 talers. In ad-
dition, you receive a lump sum show up fee of DM 5.00. 
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The Payoff Tables 
– differences in wording are marked with round (neutral treatment) and squared (loaded treatment) brackets – 
 
Round payoff if (player 2) [the public official] accepts (a transfer) [a private payment] 
(transferred amount) 
[private payment]  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 







































(... player 1) 
[... firm] 
33  53  32  52  31  51  30  50  29  49  28  48  27  47  26  46  25  45 
 
(... Player 2) 
[...public official] 
39  33  42  36  45  39  48  42  51  45  54  48  57  51  60  54  63  57 
 
... each of the other 16 
participants 
0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3  0  –3 
 
Round payoff if (player 2) [the public 
official] rejects (a transfer) [a private 
payment] 
(transferred amount) 
[private payment]  1,...,9 







(... player 1) 
[... firm] 
34  54 
 
(... Player 2) 
[...public official] 
36  30 
 
... each of the other 16 
participants 
0  –3 
Round payoff if (player 1) [the firm] 
does not (transfer an amount) [offer a 
private payment] 
(transferred amount) 
[private payment]  0 







(... player 1) 
[... firm] 
36  56 
 
(... Player 2) 
[...public official] 
36  30 
 
... each of the other 16 
participants 





Each of the 16 other pairs 
in which (Y is chosen) [a 
permission is given] de-
creases the payoff for 
(player 1 and player 2) 
[the firm and the public 
official] by another 3 tal-
ers each. 
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